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When companies face adverse proposed rules, they may want to convince regulators that
the proposed rules are unworkable and should be changed while, at the same time, reassuring
investors that the rules will be manageable. These conJlicting incentives may lead to inconsis-
tent messages in regulatory comments and securities disclosures, fueling a perception that corpo-
rate submissions to regulators are "cheap talk." Despite this perception, there has been no
empirical study comparing statements to these two audiences. This project performs such a
study, taking the example of comments submitted on the Environmental Protection Agency's
Renewable Fuel Standard. This standard provides an ideal case study because controversial
annual rulemakings have created a rich dataset of company comments that can be compared to
contemporaneous securities disclosures from the same companies.
The empirical study demonstrates that oil companies do send inconsistent messages to
their two audiences-warning regulators and reassuring investors. The Article suggests that
regulators should use this approach to assess the sincerity of industry warnings about the cost of
regulation. Private and public enforcers of securities disclosure laws should also use this ap-
proach to identify companies that are hiding regulatory risks. Finally, now that a company's
comments can be compared with its securities disclosures, corporate counsel should align com-
pany statements to avoid securities litigation and enhance the company's credibility in each
forum.
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"[T]his bill could prevent continued production of automobiles ...
[and] is a threat to the entire American economy and to every person
in America."
Lee Iacocca, President, Ford Motor Company, on the Clean Air
Act of 19701
"The automobile industry has survived and grown even in countries
where government policies have made the cost of car ownership sev-
eral times higher than it is in the United States. We have no doubt
that our industry will continue to grow, because people everywhere
place a high value on the individual mobility and on the freedom that
this mobility makes possible."
Lee Iacocca, President, and Henry Ford II, Chairman, Ford
Motor Company, Annual Report 19702
INTRODUCTION
When a public company describes the impact of a proposed regulation it
must consider two audiences: regulators and investors. It would like to convince
the regulator to avoid burdensome regulations by emphasizing how strict regu-
lations could cause job losses or reduce investment. But it may wish to convince
investors that the company will thrive in the face of any plausible regulatory
outcome. These conflicting incentives may lead to inconsistent messages and
fuel a perception that industry submissions to regulators and investors are often
"cheap talk."
Despite the common perception that corporations exaggerate the eco-
nomic impact of regulation, and anecdotal reports of inconsistencies between
comments to regulators and reports to investors, to-date there has been no em-
pirical study of congruence between submissions to regulators and shareholder
letters. This project performs and reports such a study, taking the example of
comments submitted on the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA")
1. Women's Suffrage and Other Visions ofRight-Wing Apocalypse, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 21,
2009, http://perma.cc/6DZV-YSY2 [hereinafter Women's Suffrage] (alterations in original);
HARVEY BLATT, AMERICA's ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT CARD: ARE WE MAKING THE
GRADE? 221 (2004).
2. FORD MOTOR Co., ANNUAL REPORT 1970 3 (March 10, 1971).
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Renewable Fuel Standard rulemakings between 2009 and 2013. This example
presents an ideal case study because new targets are proposed each year under
the Standard, and each year several biofuel and oil companies submit publicly
available comments. This study compares these comments with contemporane-
ous annual statements from the same companies describing their exposure to
regulatory risk.
The study empirically demonstrates that oil companies facing adverse reg-
ulations tailor their messages to each audience-emphasizing the cost and eco-
nomic danger of regulation to regulators while telling shareholders that
regulation is merely a cost of doing business with few negative impacts. On the
other hand, corporations anticipating beneficial regulations-the ethanol com-
panies planning on mandates for their product-present a more consistent and
cautiously optimistic forecast in both fora.
The Article considers the implications of these findings for environmental
regulators and private and public corporate lawyers. It suggests that environ-
mental regulators should ask companies to file excerpts from their corporate
securities disclosures along with their comments to demonstrate that they take
their own warnings about proposed regulations seriously enough to also warn
their investors. It also suggests that the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") and private plaintiffs should scrutinize company comments to deter-
mine what regulatory risks companies are pointing out to regulators without
disclosing them to investors. Finally, it suggests that corporate counsel should
align these two sets of statements to protect public companies from securities
litigation and enhance their credibility in each forum.
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I identifies the "regulator's di-
lemma" faced by policymakers that often need information from private indus-
try to set pollution standards but have good reason to distrust the information
and estimates that industry voluntarily provides. Part II describes the Renewa-
ble Fuel Standard and explains why it has become a target for so many com-
ments and a useful test case for comparing corporate comments to regulators
and securities disclosures to investors. Part III lays out the methodology devel-
oped to identify inconsistent statements to these two audiences, noting its po-
tential application to other "two-audience" problems, which often arise in
principal-agent relationships. Part IV presents the results of the study, showing
how oil companies tell EPA one thing and investors another. Part V considers
how regulators, securities enforcers, and corporate counsel can use this compar-
ative approach to provide more accurate information to regulators, greater dis-
closure of regulatory risk to investors, and improve the credibility of corporate
communications.
I. THE REGULATOR'S DILEMMA: PUBLIC DECISIONS,
PRIVATE KNOWLEDGE
In 1970, Ford Motor's President, Lee Iacocca, called the Clean Air Act "a
threat . . . to every person in America" that "could prevent continued produc-
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tion of automobiles."' His statement is an archetype of the prophesies of doom
that industry often issues in the face of new regulations.4 His prediction and
others like it are routinely cited to illustrate how corporations falsely claim that
environmental regulations will cause severe economic harm.' In contrast, retro-
spective reviews of Clean Air Act regulations have shown that these regulations
cost even less than the regulators that imposed them expected, making them far
more affordable than the stark warnings from industry suggested that they
would be. 6
As a result, when industry complains about how much a proposed regula-
tion will cost, advocates for regulation may justly respond that such predictions
have been wrong in the past. And these advocates often imply that such predic-
tions can be safely ignored. After all, no one listens to the boy who cried wolf.7
But the reason false alarms are dangerous is because they prevent us from
recognizing accurate warnings: the problem with "crying wolf' is that there are
wolves. Some regulatory standards would, in fact, be technically impossible or
economically infeasible to achieve. So when regulators set standards through
notice-and-comment rulemaking,8 they almost always consider whether these
standards are achievable.' And regulators generally do not ignore industry's pre-
3. Women's Suffrage, supra note 1 (alteration in original); BLATT, supra note 1, at 221.
4. See, e.g., Alan S. Miller, Environmental Regulation, Technological Innovation, and Technology
Forcing, 10 NAT. REs. & ENvT. 64, 65 (1995); see also James V. Cornehis, Politics, Regula-
tion, and Urban Transportation Priorities: The Triumph of the Auto Society, 7 ANTITRUST L. &
EcoN. REv. 69, 75 (1974); Jagul Lee et al., Forcing Technological Change: A Case ofAutomo-
bile Emissions Control Technology Development in the U.S., 30 TECHNOVATION 249, 260
(2010).
5. See Cry Wolf Project, http://perma.cc/9V9D-3C7X (collecting corporate predictions that
regulations will cause significant harm); Eban Goodstein, Behind the Numbers: Polluted Data,
THE AM. PROSPECT, Nov. 16, 2001, http://perma.cc/DK3Y-GTUS (collecting examples of
overestimated costs of regulations including regulations for asbestos, benzene, chlorofluoro-
carbons, coke ovens, cotton dust, halons, and vinyl chloride); Lisa Heinzerling et al., Apply-
ing Cost-Benefit to Past Decisions: Was Environmental Protection Ever a Good Idea?, 57
ADMIN. L. REv. 155, 190-92 (2005) (cost of reducing vinyl chloride was overestimated);
SMALL BUSINESS MAJORITY & THE MAIN STREET ALLIANCE, THE CLEAN AIR ACT's
ECONOMIC BENEFITS PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 6-7 (2010) (documenting that costs of
reducing sulfur dioxide under the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments came in well under all
estimates); Don Munton, Dispelling the Myths of the Acid Rain Story, 40 ENv'T 4, 7, 27
(1998) (same).
6. EPA, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT: 1970 TO 1990 (1997), http://
perma.cc/9R74-965T. For a critical review of this study, see Performance of the Clean Air Act
and its Amendments: Hearing Before the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. (2002)
(statement of Alan Krupnick), http://perma.cc/EZ3Y-VVVLZ, which argues that EPA's
study has "some important and acknowledged shortcomings" but ultimately agrees with the
study's conclusion that the Clean Air Act's "total benefits to society exceed its costs."
7. In Aesop's fable, a shepherd boy cries "Wolf!" because it amuses him when his neighbors
rush to help him and find no wolf; when a wolf really comes, no one believes his cries for
help, and the wolf devours his whole flock. AESOP, THE Boy WHO CRIED WOLF, in the
FABLES OF AESOP AND OTHERs 263 (Joseph Johnson ed. 1805).
8. Anne Joseph O'Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern
Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REv. 889, 901-02 (2008) (briefly explaining the notice-and-
comment process of informal rulemaking).
9. E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1493 (1992) (noting that
Supreme Court decisions have made "notice-and-comment rulemaking under §553 of the
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dictions about the feasibility and cost of compliance because private industry
generally has more information on these points.10
Thus regulators face a fundamental difficulty when they set regulatory
standards, which could be called the "regulator's dilemma." Public regulators
often must prescribe standards that require the "best" or "lowest" rate of pollu-
tion that is "available," "demonstrated," "achievable," or "practicable."" But pri-
vate industry generally has the most complete information about the monetary
cost and practical feasibility of different control technologies. 12 And industry
[Administrative Procedure Act] ... into the principal mechanism through which the gov-
ernment develops detailed technical standards regulating the economy" and explaining its
role in creating a record for a reviewing court); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American
Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29, 61-65 (1985). Even when statutes do not allow regulators
to make decisions based on cost, regulators often consider cost as a matter of economic or
political necessity. Daniel A. Farber, Rethinking the Role of Cost-benefit Analysis, 76 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1355, 1372-79 (2009) (demonstrating that regulators frequently use cost-benefit
analyses even when the statute they are implementing directs them not to consider cost);
Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Rethinking Health-Based Environmental Stan-
dards, 89 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1184, 1231-35 (2014) (explaining why regulators are often driven
to consider cost even when they are implementing health-based statutes).
10. Many scholars have explained how private actors shape regulation by informing, influencing,
and persuading regulators through submitted comments. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman,
Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 1749, 1780-82 (2007);
Scott Furlong, Interest Group Influence on Rule Making, 29 ADMIN. & Soc'Y 325, 339-41
(1997) (documenting the importance industry places on communication with regulators);
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deosssfy Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REv. 59,
87-88 (1995); Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985
DuKE L.J. 381, 403 (1985) ("An invitation to submit comments stimulates outsiders to
furnish data and other inputs, providing a source of low-cost information to agency deci-
sionmakers. A rule is likely to be a better product if its drafters must consider seriously
alternatives that they might have overlooked or take account of practical problems that oth-
erwise would crop up only after a rule goes into effect."); Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly
Signaling Theory of "Hard Look"Judicial Review, 58 ADMIN. L. REv. 753, 761-63 (2006); see
also Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (lack of
agency response or consideration to a comment "becomes of concern" when it is "significant
enough to step over a threshold requirement of materiality"); Ronald Levin, Direct Final
Rulemaking, 64 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1, 16 (1995) (arguing that it would be "problematic"
for an agency to commit to a rulemaking course without first considering comments from
the public). But see Jack M. Beermann, Presidential Power in Transitions, 83 B.U. L. REv.
947, 1001-02 (2003) (arguing that, in practice, it is not possible for a reviewing court to
require an agency to keep an open mind).
11. Such standards are particularly common under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1)
(2012) (prescribing the "best system of emission reduction which . . . has been adequately
demonstrated"); 42 U.S.C. § 7501(3) (defining the "lowest achievable emission rate" for air
pollutants), and Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A)(i) (requiring "best available
technology" for water pollutants); 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A)(i) (requiring "best conven-
tional pollutant control technology" for water pollutants); 33 U.S.C. § 1281(b) (2012) (re-
quiring "the application of the best practicable waste treatment technology"). See also
Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI. L. REv. 657,
664-67 (2010) (describing the "best available," "reasonably available," and "best practicable"
standards).
12. Cary Coglianese et al., Seeking Truth for Power: Informational Strategy and Regulatory Poli-
cymaking, 89 MINN. L. REv. 277, 278-79 (2004) ("In particular, regulators need detailed
and accurate information about the operations of private business enterprises to understand
the scope and cause of regulatory problems, and to craft effective solutions to them."); Jody
Freeman & Daniel Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DuKE L.J. 795, 815
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has little reason to accurately report this private information; instead it often
has an incentive to exaggerate the costs of new pollution control technologies
and minimize their benefits to dissuade regulators from mandating new tech-
nologies that will reduce industry profits.'"
This leaves regulators in a bind. One partial solution would be to look to
industry leaders in pollution control and demand that the entire industry
achieve the same level of control. One could call this the "catch-up regulation"
approach: everyone must catch up to the industry leader. But this approach is
still imperfect and can result in either too-lax or too-stringent standards. Stan-
dards may be too lax if the whole industry could efficiently upgrade its pollution
control: after all, we often hope that standards can be "technology-forcing."14
And standards may be too strict if not all facilities can achieve the same reduc-
tions" due to different geography, climate, or pre-existing equipment. 5 To
achieve their legal and policy goals, regulators need private information to cali-
brate the standards that they set.
(2005) ("much of the information most relevant to prescriptive regulators is in the hands of
industry, including information about the costs of controlling emissions, operational details
about industrial processes, and rates of compliance"); Fenner L. Stewart, The Corporation,
New Governance, and the Power of the Publicization Narrative, 21 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 513, 527-28 (2014) (explaining how modern regulation is "dependent on the infor-
mation that exchanges between regulators and the regulated to learn of and respond to com-
plex regulatory challenges in a timely and effective manner or, more dramatically, simply to
avoid regulatory failure"); see also David Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Mar-
kets?, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 767, 771 (2008) (describing how this dynamic affects utility
regulators in particular).
13. James Coleman, Unilateral Climate Regulation, 38 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 87, 112 (2014)
("disparate cost estimates are often a principal focus of political and legal controversy con-
cerning" environmental performance standards); Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A
Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. LJ. 1, 19 (1982) (noting that in these comments "private partici-
pants tend to take extreme positions" and those "that oppose any regulation or that hope to
obtain a minimally intrusive regulation may argue that no regulation is needed or that at
most a weak one is required, and will tailor their evidence accordingly"). On the other hand,
in some cases companies may prefer stricter regulation if it will insulate those companies
from competition. See DALE D. MURPHY, THE STRUCTURE OF REGULATORY COMPETI-
TION: CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (2007) 120-23
(describing how this process may explain regulation of ozone-depleting substances); Bruce
Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists-The Education of a Regulatory Economist, 7 REGULATION
12 (1983) (explaining how anti-competitive and pro-regulatory forces may combine in favor
of strict regulation); Bruce G. Carruthers & Naomi Lamoreaux, Regulatory Races: The Effects
of Jurisdictional Competition on Regulatory Standards 8 (UCLA Econ., Working Paper,
2009), http://perma.cc/H2QP-3SUK ("large firms may prefer to operate under a more strin-
gent regulatory regime if it puts smaller competitors at a disadvantage"). Finally, one reason
that environmental regulation often costs less than advertised is that it motivates innovation
that makes compliance cheaper. Pascual Berrone et al., Necessity as the Mother of 'Green'
Inventions: Institutional Pressures and Environmental Innovations, 34 STRAT. MGMT. J. 891,
895-96 (2013); Michael E. Porter & Claas van der Linde, Toward a New Conception of the
Environment-Competitiveness Relationship, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 4, 97 (1995).
14. See D. Bruce La Pierre, Technology-Forcing and Federal Environmental Protection Statutes, 62
IoWA L. REv. 771, 772-73 (1977).
15. Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L.
REv. 1333, 1335 (1985) ("Uniform [best available technology] requirements waste many
billions of dollars annually by ignoring variations among plants and industries in the cost of
reducing pollution and by ignoring geographic variations in pollution effects.").
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As a result, environmental regulators are locked in ubiquitous stand-offs
with industry, in which industry claims a new environmental rule is infeasible
and the agency must decide whether industry is bluffing. 6 This dilemma is
most obvious with command-and-control regulation where the agency directly
mandates facilities' emission rates, but can also arise when an agency sets
broader goals for national or statewide reductions. Thus, even market-based
regulations are often challenged based on their feasibility or economic impact."
This dilemma also applies in several settings outside environmental regulation
and to choices made by other public officials such as prosecutors,'" judges,19 and
legislators,20 who are often told that they are imposing infeasible mandates on
United States companies.
16. A salient recent example is EPA's Clean Power Plan for state power sector greenhouse gas
emissions. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 60). For example, utility companies, joined by the continent's electric reliability watch-
dog, have suggested that EPA's plan is so ambitious that it might endanger reliability of
electricity by too rapidly phasing out coal power. See N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP.,
POTENTIAL RELIABILITY IMPACTS OF EPA's PROPOSED CLEAN POWER PLAN: INITIAL
RELIABILITY REVIEw (2014), http://perma.cc/84TR-JF2R; Herman K. Trabish, Comments
Are in on the EPA's Clean Power Plan: Utilities Say the Rules Go Too Far, Too Fast, UTILITY
DIVE, Dec. 2, 2014, http://perma.cc/9FTR-YDQX. Environmental groups have responded
that these concerns are overstated. John Moore, New Report: States Can Cut Carbon Pollution
and Protect Grid Reliability, NRDC SWITCHBOARD BLOG, http://perma.cc/9B2W-TY3D
("NERC's 'sky is falling' message reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of the proposed
Clean Power Plan's compliance flexibility.").
17. David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?: Replacing the Com-
mand and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 289, 327-28
(1998) (describing how market-based regulations present many of the same problems as
traditional regulations).
18. For example, anti-corruption prosecutors are sometimes told that aggressive enforcement of
foreign corrupt practices will push U.S. businesses overseas. See, e.g., COMMITrEE ON IN-
TERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, NEW YORK CITY BAR ASSOCIATION, THE
FCPA AND ITS IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: SHOULD ANY-
THING BE DONE TO MINIMIZE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE U.S.'s UNIQUE POSITION
ON COMBATING OFFSHORE CORRUPTION? 23 (2011), http://perma.cc/X47A-5XQ9; see
also William Magnuson, International Corporate Bribery and Unilateral Enforcement, 51
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 360 (2013).
19. For example, courts are sometimes warned that their punitive damages award could cause
American businesses to shut down. James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive Dam-
ages: A Relic That Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1117, 1120 (1984); W. Kip
Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive Damages Against Corporations in Environmental and
Safety Torts, 87 GEo. L.J. 285, 326 (1998) ("Once damages become excessively high, either
product development will stagnate or firms will withdraw from the market altogether. Such
withdrawal has been experienced in the United States private aircraft industry's production
of private planes.").
20. Legislators also must consider whether laws demand more than an established industry can
provide. For example, scholars have suggested that the demise of free checking accounts for
consumers can be attributed to legislation that forced banks to charge lower interchange fees
to retailers on debit card transactions. See generally David S. Evans et al., The Impact of the
U.S. Debit Card Interchange Fee Regulation on Consumer Welfare: An Event Study Analysis
(Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 658, 2013), http://perma.cc/
TL7P-HVGQ, David S. Evans, Howard H. Chang & Margaret Weichert, Analysis of
Claims in Support of the 'Durbin Amendment' to Regulate Debit Card Interchange Fees
(May 12, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://perma.cc/3HVY-C44X.
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This study demonstrates how another set of corporate statements can be
used to audit corporations' regulatory submissions, easing the regulator's di-
lemma. Public corporations must make predictions about the impact of pro-
posed regulations to another audience: their investors.21 Public companies must
file an annual report with the SEC, known as Form 10-K, that summarizes the
state of their business and includes a summary of the important risks facing the
business. 22
At least in theory, these predictions are more constrained than statements
made to other regulators because corporations may be held liable under SEC
Rule 10b-5 for false or misleading statements and omissions made to the pub-
lic.23 Annual 10-K reports are a frequent basis for lawsuits under Rule 10b-5, 24
including lawsuits alleging that 10-K reports downplayed regulatory risk,25 and
many scholars have argued or assumed that this liability induces more honest
21. 17 C.F.R. § 229.503 (2015) ("Where appropriate, provide under the caption 'Risk Factors' a
discussion of the most significant factors that make the offering speculative or risky. This
discussion must be concise and organized logically. Do not present risks that could apply to
any issuer or any offering. Explain how the risk affects the issuer or the securities being
offered. Set forth each risk factor under a subcaption that adequately describes the risk.")
And the SEC strongly encourages them to do so in plain language. Tim Loughran & Bill
McDonald, Plain English, Readability, and 10-K Filings 1 (Univ. of Notre Dame, Working
Paper, 2009) ("Although the rule is restricted to prospectuses, SEC documents clearly en-
courage firms to adopt the principles in all their filings and communications with sharehold-
ers." (citing SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, A PLAIN ENGLISH HANDBOOK 4 (1998))).
Underlying the adoption of extensive disclosure requirements was a legislative philosophy:
"There cannot be honest markets without honest publicity. Manipulation and dishonest
practices of the market place thrive upon mystery and secrecy." Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485
U.S. 224, 230 (1988) (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 11 (1934)).
22. 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (2015); see also Arnold S. Jacobs, What Is a Misleading Statement or
Omission Under Rule 10b-5?, 42 FORDHAM L. REv. 243, 260-67 (1973) (describing how
lOb-5 liability may result from corporate securities filings); David S. Ruder & Neil S. Cross,
Limitations on Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 1972 DUKE L.J. 1125, 1129.
23. Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015); Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975); see also GERARD HERTIG,
REINIER KRAAKMAN & EDWARD ROCK, Issuer and Investor Protection, in THE ANATOMy
OF CORPORATE LAw 300 (2009) ("The U.S. still mandates the world's most extensive pub-
lic reporting requirements . . . and deploys unparalleled private and public enforcement mea-
sures in the cause of investor protection.").
24. See, e.g., Asher v. Baxter Intern. Inc., 377 F.3d 727, 734 (7th Cir. 2004) (allowing case to
proceed because defendant may have "omitted important variables from the cautionary lan-
guage and so made projections more certain than its internal estimates at the time war-
ranted"); Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 559 (6th Cit. 2001) (holding that a company
can be liable for minimizing regulatory risk, and writing: "Yet as the Budget Act neared
enactment and as the warning signs flared, Vencor's precautions grew more cursory and
abstract. In its first- and second-quarter filings of 1997, the company stated only that it
could not predict the form, effect, or likelihood of any proposed legislation."); see also Stoner-
idge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 767 (2008) (considering lob-5
suit based "on financial statements filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) and reported to the public"); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 452
& n.13 (1976) (same, including Form 10-K); JAMES BROWN, THE REGULATION OF COR-
PORATE DISCLOSURE § 6A.05 (Supp. 2015-2).
25. See, e.g., Helwig, 251 F.3d at 559.
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corporate disclosures of risk.2 6 Furthermore, accounting bodies and the SEC
have pursued several initiatives to improve reporting of risks due to environ-
mental regulation.2 1 Corporations, it is true, retain more latitude in making
predictions about the future under the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act's "safe harbor" and the bespeaks caution doctrine. 28 But neither rule ab-
solves a corporation of liability for a prediction that is made in bad faith or
contradicted by contemporaneous predictions to regulators.29
Regulators concerned by Lee lacocca's prophesies of doom in 1970 would
have been reassured if they had read Ford Motor Company's contemporaneous
Form 10-K disclosures. In its 1970 report, the company assured its investors
that its domestic operations would continue to succeed because "[t]he automo-
bile industry has survived and grown even in countries where government poli-
cies have made the cost of car ownership several times higher than it is in the
United States." 0 It concluded, "[w]e have no doubt that our industry will con-
tinue to grow."" This statement was signed by two people on behalf of the
board of directors: Henry Ford II and Lee Iacocca.3 2
26. Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN.
L. REv. 385, 409 (1990); see also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms
of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549, 601 (1984) (discussing the efficiencies of placing
the burden of disclosure on the issuers of securities); Louis E. Ebinger, Note, Sarbanes-Oxley
Section 501(a): No Implied Private Right ofAction, and a Call to Congress for an Express Pri-
vate Right of Action to Enhance Analyst Disclosure, 93 IowA L. REv. 1919, 1945 (2008).
27. In 2010, the Securities and Exchange Commission issued binding guidance requiring com-
panies to disclose risks related to climate regulation. Commission Guidance Regarding Dis-
closure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg. 6290, 6296 (Feb. 8, 2010) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 211, 231, and 241) ("Item 303 requires registrants to assess whether any
enacted climate change legislation or regulation is reasonably likely to have a material effect
on the registrant's financial condition or results of operation."); see also Rick Hansen, Climate
Change Disclosure by SEC Registrants: Revisiting the SEC's 2010 Interpretive Release, 6
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & CoM. L. 487, 490 (2012). This guidance built on an initiative by
New York's Attorney General that resulted in settlement agreements with large energy com-
panies that required them to report risks from climate change and climate change regulation.
Seth Kerschner, Power Companies Agree to Expanded Disclosure of Climate Change Risk in
Landmark Settlements with New York Attorney General, 61 A.B.A. ENVTL. DIsCLOSURE
COMM. NEWSL. 1, 11 (2009). In 1995, the American Accounting Association's Securities
and Exchange Commission Liaison Committee had identified risk from environmental reg-
ulation as a priority for improved disclosure. Robert J. Sack et al., Mountaintop Issues: From
the Perspective of the SEC, 9 AccT. HORIZONs 79, 80 (1995).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5; see also Plumbers Union v. Nomura Asset Acceptance Corp., 632 F.3d
762, 772 (1st Cir. 2011).
29. See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct.
1318, 1329 (2015) (writing that a statement of opinion in a securities disclosure is actionable
under SEC Rule 11 if it does not represent the issuer's honest opinion or does not "fairly
align[ ] with the information in the issuer's possession at the time"); Nakkhumpun v. Taylor,
782 F.3d 1142, 1159 (10th Cir. 2015) (applying Omnicare to Rule lOb-5 claim); Alison Grey
Anderson, The Disclosure Process in Federal Securities Regulation: A Brief Review, 25 HAS-
TINGs L.J. 311, 348-49 (1973); Victor Brudney, A Note on Materiality and Soft Information
Under the Federal Securities Laws, 75 VA. L. REv. 723, 726-27 (1989).
30. FORD MOTOR Co., supra note 2, at 3 (going on to say "[b]ut it will grow more and serve
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This Article shows how this alternate set of corporate statements on the
impact of regulation, collected in Form 10-K submissions, can be compared to
corporate statements on proposed rules. If corporations warn regulators that
rules will cause them economic harm but fail to warn their investors of the same
risks in 10-K reports, then we can conclude that they are either exaggerating
the harm from the rules or failing to disclose important risks to their investors."
Going forward, environmental and securities regulators should perform this
type of audit to gauge the seriousness of corporate warnings and to ensure that
corporations are adequately disclosing risk.
11. THE RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD: A RUNNING BATILE IN
NOTICE-AND-COMMENT RULEMAKING
The United States Renewable Fuel Standard requires oil companies to
blend a specified proportion of renewable fuels such as ethanol into the fuels
that they sell.34 It presents an ideal test case for developing a method to com-
pare corporate statements to regulators and investors for three reasons. First,
EPA generally proposes and finalizes an updated standard each year, giving oil
and biofuel companies many opportunities to comment. Second, these stan-
dards present an archetypal example of a regulator's dilemma: as the study
shows, oil companies have frequently warned EPA that its proposed regulations
are infeasible, while biofuel companies have disagreed. Third, the United States
consumes a fifth of the world's oil production, so its fuel regulations are a cru-
cial source of financial risk even for corporations that participate in interna-
tional markets." This section provides a brief explanation of the Renewable
Fuel Standard and the continuing controversy surrounding it to explain why
annual rulemakings under the standard continue to attract such interest from
oil and ethanol companies.
33. Previous scholarship has suggested that annual reports often portray the best image of a
company. Luis Fernando Escobar & Harrie Vredenburg, Multinational Oil Companies and
the Adoption of Sustainable Development: A Resource-based and Institutional Theory Interpreta-
tion of Adoption Heterogeneity, 98 J. Bus. ETHIcs 39, 51 (2011). These reports are often
prepared by public relations specialists rather than the top management. Eric Abrahamson &
Donald C. Hambrick, Attentional Homogeneity in Industries: The Effect of Discretion, 18 J.
ORG. BEHAVIOUR 513, 520 (1997); Pamela S. Barr, J. L. Stimpert & Anne S. Huff, Cogni-
tive Change, Strategic Action, and Organizational Renewal, 13 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 15, 21
(1992); Stephen E. Clapham & Charles R. Schwenk, Self-serving Attributions, Managerial
Cognition, and Company Performance, 12 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 219, 219-20 (1991). Annual
reports are a more consistent and reliable measure of communication to shareholders as
compared with press releases, transcripts from shareholders' meeting and interviews with
executives. Vincent J. Duriau, Rhonda K. Reger & Michael D. Pfarrer, A Content Analysis of
the Content Analysis Literature in the Organization Studies: Research Themes, Data Sources, and
Methodological Refinements, 10 ORG. RES. METHODS 5, 17 (2007).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o); Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Renewable Fuel Standard
Program, 72 Fed. Reg. 23,900, 23,903 (May 1, 2007) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80).
35. BP STATISTICAL REVIEW OF WORLD ENERGY 9 (2014) (in 2013 the U.S. consumed
19.9% of global oil production; China is the next largest at 12.1%).
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The stated goals of the Renewable Fuel Standard are to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions, reduce reliance on imported petroleum, and develop the coun-
try's renewable fuel sector.36 Renewable fuels like ethanol and biodiesel are de-
rived from plants or natural waste products and used as a substitute for more
traditional motor fuels that are derived from oil such as gasoline and diesel."
When renewable fuels are burned in an engine, they produce greenhouse gas
emissions, just like oil products." But when plants grow, they pull carbon diox-
ide out of the air, so if plants are grown and burned at the same rate, the net
impact on the atmosphere is zero. 9 And if you burn plant and animal waste
products that would otherwise have decomposed into greenhouse gases, then
you may not have added any carbon to the atmosphere compared to what
would have otherwise occurred. 0 So, in theory, replacing oil products with re-
newable fuels can reduce the net amount of greenhouse gases emitted to the
atmosphere as a result of motor fuels.41
Renewable fuels have also attracted support as an alternative to oil imports
that may send money to countries hostile to United States' interests.42 And by
36. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 801 (amending 42
U.S.C. § 17281) ("The production of transportation fuels from renewable energy would help
the United States meet rapidly growing domestic and global energy demands, reduce the
dependence of the United States on energy imported from volatile regions of the world that
are politically unstable, stabilize the cost and availability of energy, and safeguard the econ-
omy and security of the United States.").
37. RANDY SCHNEPF & BRENT D. YACOBUCCI, CONG. RES. SERV., R40155, RENEWABLE
FUEL STANDARD (RFS): OVERVIEW AND ISSUES 16 (2013) ("[T]he mandated 36 bgals of
renewable fuel will displace about 13.6 bgals of petroleum-based gasoline and diesel fuel,
representing about 7% of expected annual U.S. transportation fuel consumption.").
38. Id.; How Much Carbon Dioxide Is Produced by Burning Gasoline and Diesel Fuel?, U.S. EN-
ERGY INFO. ADMIN.: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONs (July 7, 2015), http://perma.cc/
C9UK-XK9U. In general, when "renewable" fuels are used for combustion, there is no cli-
mate benefit in the combustion itself. The benefit, if any, comes from the carbon that is
taken out of the air before the product is burned. Ross GORTE, CONG. REs. SERV.,
RL31432, CARBON SEQUESTRATION IN FORESTs 16 (2009), http://perma.cc/2KR5-
DDWP ("Although wood could replace some fossil fuels, it still produces Icarbon dioxide]
(and water vapor and some other by-products) when burned."); KELSI BRACMORT, CONG.
REs. SERV., R41603, Is BIOPOWER CARBON NEUTRAL? (2015), http://perma.cc/2LYX-
DPDL.
39. Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Changes to Renewable Fuel Standard Program, 74
Fed. Reg. 24,904, 25,040 (May 26, 2009) ("Combustion [carbon dioxide] emissions for eth-
anol, biomass-based diesel, petroleum diesel and gasoline were based on the carbon content
of the fuel. However, over the full lifecycle of the fuel, the [carbon dioxide] emitted from
biomass-based fuels combustion does not increase atmospheric [carbon dioxide] concentra-
tions, assuming the biogenic carbon emitted is offset by the uptake of [carbon dioxide] re-
sulting from the growth of new biomass."). It is not clear, however, that plants are grown
and burned at the same rate that they would be without ethanol use.
40. BRAcMORT, supra note 38, at 8 ("EPA reports that it considered information that 'supports
the finding that use of waste-derived feedstocks and certain forest-derived industrial byprod-
ucts are likely to have minimal or no net atmospheric contributions of biogenic C02 emis-
sions, or even reduce such impacts, when compared with an alternate fate of disposal.'").
41. In fact, the net climate impact of renewable fuels is sharply contested. See id. at 1.
42. In reality, the United States imports three times as much oil from Canada as from any other
country, but the next four biggest sellers are Saudi Arabia, Mexico, Russia, and Venezuela.
How Much Petroleum Does the United States Import and from Where?, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
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diversifying fuel sources renewable fuels may protect consumers from volatile oil
prices that are set in world markets, which the United States cannot control.43
By the same token, it might allow the U.S. government to focus fewer geopolit-
ical resources on major sources of world oil production, such as the Middle
East.44 Finally, supporters of the Renewable Fuel Standard often focus on how
it benefits the renewable fuel industry by guaranteeing it a market, and benefits
agricultural communities by providing a certain market for their products. 45
The Renewable Fuel Standard was first created under the Energy Policy
Act of 2005, and it took an unusual form. 46 Instead of requiring that transpor-
tation fuels contain a specified percentage of renewable fuel, the Act mandated
that a minimum volume of renewable fuel be sold in the United States each
year. 47 It required EPA to ensure that 7.5 billion gallons of renewable fuel be
sold in the United States by 2012.48 EPA, in turn, finalized a rule in 2007 that
required fuel refiners to blend a specified percentage of renewable fuel into
transportation fuels like gasoline and diesel. 49 EPA used an estimate of how
much fuel of all kinds would be sold in the United States and then mandated a
percentage of renewable fuel that would ensure that the required volume of
renewable fuel was sold. 0
In 2007, Congress dramatically expanded the Renewable Fuel Standard as
part of the Energy Independence and Security Act.s" The Act also set out year-
ADMIN.: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (Sept. 14, 2015), http://perma.cc/TS4Y-
PXBN.
43. James Coleman, The Shale 'Revolution' Is About Gas Prices & Oil Production, ENERGY COL-
LECTIVE (Jul. 17, 2014), http://perma.cc/9AKC-S7LL.
44. MICHAEL RATNER & CAROL GLOVER, CONG. REs. SERV., R40187, U.S. ENERGY:
OVERVIEW AND KEY STATISncs 19 (2014), http://perma.cc/AR8F-Z6EC ("The concen-
tration of oil resources in the Persian Gulf countries means that the political events in the
Middle East can have great influence on the oil market.").
45. SCHNEPF & YACOBUCCI, supra note 37, at 17 (noting the argument that Renewable Fuel
Standard "provides an additional source of demand-renewable biofuels-for U.S. agricul-
tural output that has significant agricultural and rural economic benefits via increased farm
and rural incomes and substantial rural employment opportunities"). On the other hand,
there is growing concern about other environmental harms exacerbated by cultivation of
biofuels. See Joseph Fargione et al., The Ecological Impact of Biofuels, 41 ANN. REV. ECOL.
EVOL. SYST. 351, 360 (2010) (noting significant impacts on land-use and biodiversity).
46. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58. Ethanol was also once supported with
significant tax credits, which have now expired. Alexandra B. Klass, Tax Benefits, Property
Rights, and Mandates: Considering the Future of Government Support for Renewable Energy, 20
J. ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L. 19, 33-37 (2013).
47. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1501 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 7545).
48. Id. § 1501 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(i)).
49. Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Renewable Fuel Standard Program, 72 Fed. Reg.
23,900, 23,903 (May 1, 2007) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80) ("In order to ensure the
use of the total renewable fuel volume specified for each year, the Agency must set a standard
for each year representing the amount of renewable fuel that each refiner, blender, or im-
porter must use, expressed as a percentage of gasoline sold or introduced into commerce.
This yearly percentage standard is to be set at a level that will ensure that the total renewable
fuel volumes shown in Table I.B-1 will be used based on gasoline volume projections pro-
vided by the Energy Information Administration.").
50. See id.
51. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140.
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by-year targets for renewable fuel consumption, demanding that renewable fuel
sales swell from 9 billion gallons in 2008 to 36 billion gallons by 2022.52 And it
extended the standard to include diesel as well as gasoline and established sepa-
rate categories of renewable fuel such as advanced biofuel and cellulosic ethanol,
each with its own volume standard to be set every year." It also required EPA
to apply life cycle greenhouse gas calculations to ensure that each category of
renewable fuel emits substantially less greenhouse gas than the petroleum fuel it
replaces. 54 Figure 1 shows how the Energy Independence and Security Act
mandated dramatically increasing volumes of each type of fuel.
52. Id. § 202 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)).
53. Id.
54. Id. Life cycle greenhouse gas emissions are all emissions related to the production and use of
a fuel. James Coleman, Importing Energy, Exporting Regulation, 83 FORDHAM L. REv. 1357,
1373-74 & n.95 (2015) (explaining calculation of life cycle greenhouse gas emissions for
ethanol). The Energy Independence and Security Act also established a trading program of
renewable identification number credits. A credit is generated when a gallon of renewable
fuel is produced. Companies can either produce renewable fuel or purchase credits from
other companies to comply with the Renewable Fuel Standard. Energy Independence and
Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-140, § 104 (amending 49 U.S.C. § 32903).
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FIGURE 1. RENEWABLE FUEL VOLUMEs REQUIRED BY THE ENERGY
INDEPENDENCE AND SECURITY ACT5 5
2009 Conventional (corn) ethanol
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EPA set out to implement the revised Renewable Fuel Standard, some-
times known as "RFS2,"s6 through annual rulemakings, mandating specified
percentages of four categories of renewable fuel: biomass-based diesel, advanced
biofuel, cellulosic biofuel, and total renewable fuel." The Energy Independence
and Security Act required EPA to set the annual standard each year by Novem-
55. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(i) (prescribing volumes for renewable fuels, advanced biofuel,
cellulosic biofuel, and biomass-based diesel). Prescribed volumes of biomass-based diesel end
in 2012 at one billion gallons, which is the plateau for biomass-based diesel shown in this
chart, but EPA is given continuing authority to adjust this volume up or down in subsequent
years. Id. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(i)(IV).
56. Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Changes to Renewable Fuel Standard Program, 74
Fed. Reg. 24,904, 24,908 (May 26, 2009) ('The renewable fuel program established by [the
Energy Independence and Security Act], hereafter referred to as RFS2, mandates the use of
36 billion gallons of renewable fuel by 2022.").
57. Id. at 24,910.
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ber 30 before the start of the year in which it would apply."5 But EPA has
struggled to meet these deadlines. The final rule for 2010, which also included
some requirements for 2008 and 2009, was not published until March 26,
2010.59 The 2011 and 2012 rules were only a few weeks late,60 but the 2013 rule
was not finalized until August 201361 and the 2014 rule was so late that EPA
decided to just roll it into the 2015 rulemaking. 62
Throughout its brief existence the annual renewable fuel standard
rulemakings have attracted significant comments from the oil industry, the re-
newable fuels industry, and companies that indirectly benefit from these indus-
tries as well as other stakeholders. EPA docketed 3,955 unique public
comments from 2010 to 2013, the years covered in this study.63 Thirty-six pub-
lic companies filed comments: sixteen from the oil industry and other industries
that oppose higher ethanol mandates and twenty from the ethanol industry as
well as related pro-ethanol businesses.64 Several companies submitted com-
ments in multiple years, so the thirty-six companies submitted 56 unique com-
ments. Furthermore, some of these companies endorsed comments from two
oil-trade associations, the American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers'
Association and the American Petroleum Institute, and two ethanol trade as-
sociations, the Renewable Fuels Association and the Brazilian Sugarcane In-
dustry Association. Figure 2 shows how many comments were filed in each
year.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(3)(B)(i) ("Not later than November 30 of each of calendar years 2005
through 2021, based on the estimate provided under subparagraph (A), the Administrator of
the Environmental Protection Agency shall determine and publish in the Federal Register,
with respect to the following calendar year, the renewable fuel obligation that ensures that
the requirements of paragraph (2) are met.").
59. Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Changes to Renewable Fuel Standard Program, 75
Fed. Reg. 14,670 (March 26, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R pt. 80).
60. Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: 2011 Renewable Fuel Standards, 75 Fed. Reg.
76,790 (Dec. 9, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80); Regulation of Fuels and Fuel
Additives: 2012 Renewable Fuel Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 1320 (Jan. 9, 2012) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80).
61. Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: 2013 Renewable Fuel Standards, 78 Fed. Reg.
49,794 (Aug. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80).
62. Delay in Issuing 2014 Standards for the Renewable Fuel Standard Program, 79 Fed. Reg.
73,007 (Dec. 9, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80).
63. Many more comments were filed as part of letter-writing campaigns, but EPA does not
include duplicative comments in its online docket. As of March 2015, the controversial 2014
rule had received 344,326 comments. See infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
64. The sixteen anti-ethanol companies are: The Boeing Company, BP plc, Caterpillar, Ce-
lanese Corporation, Chevron Corporation, ConocoPhillips, CVR Energy Inc., ExxonMobil
Corporation, Ford Motor Company, LyondellBasell Industries N.Y., Marathon Petroleum
Corporation, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Phillips 66, Royal Dutch Shell plc, United
Refining Company, Valero Energy Corporation. The twenty pro-ethanol companies are
Amyris Inc., Archer Daniels Midland Company, Bluefire Renewables Inc., Clean Energy
Fuels Corporation, Covanta Holding Corporation, Darling International Inc., Deere &
Company, E. I. Du Pont De Nemours and Company, Gevo Inc., Greenshift Corporation,
Honeywell International Inc., Iowa Renewable Energy LLC, MagellanMidstream Partners
LP, Monsanto Company, Renewable Energy Group Inc., Rentech Inc., Syntroleum Corpo-
ration, Tyson Foods Inc., WasteManagement Inc., and Weyerhauser Company. See https://
perma.cc/P7NM-XQQ3.
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FIGURE 2. NUMBER OF COMMENTS IN EACH YEAR6 5
2010 2011 2012 2013
Total 3257 529* 529* 169
Publiccompanies 33 3 9 11
Anti-ethanolcompanies 14 1 6 7
Pro-ethanolcompanies 19 2 3 4
'The 2011 and 2012 rules used a combined docket. Public company comments made clear
which year they were addressing, but the total number here is for both years.
Even after nearly a decade, the Renewable Fuel Standard remains ex-
tremely controversial because of two developments in the United States' energy
markets: a fall in gasoline consumption, and the failure of the renewable fuel
industry to produce the quantities of cellulosic ethanol mandated by the Re-
newable Fuel Standard. When Congress passed the Energy Independence and
Security Act in 2007, the U.S. projected that gasoline use would continue to
increase in coming decades, just as it had in past decades.66 But when the finan-
cial crisis hit in 2008, growth in gasoline consumption abruptly ended, and it
now seems that gasoline consumption may remain flat or continue falling."7
Figure 3 provides an excellent visualization from President Obama's 2015 Eco-
nomic Report showing how dramatically projections of future gasoline use have
changed over the past decade: the United States is now projected to use only
half as much gasoline in 2030 as was projected just nine years ago.
65. Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Changes to Renewable Fuel Standard Program, 75
Fed. Reg. 14,670 (March 26, 2010); Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: 2011
Renewable Fuel Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 76,790 (Dec. 9, 2010); Regulation of Fuels and
Fuel Additives: 2012 Renewable Fuel Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 1320 (Jan. 9, 2012);
Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: 2013 Renewable Fuel Standards, 78 Fed. Reg.
49,794 (Aug. 15, 2013).
66. EcoNoMic REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 246 (2015), https://perma.cc/2HWV-EJS7.
67. Id. This development is aided by increased fuel economy standards for cars and trucks.
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The fall in gasoline consumption created substantial problems for the Re-
newable Fuel Standard because the standard calls for dramatically increasing
sales of renewable fuel at the same moment that total fuel sales are falling.
Achieving the standard would require a rapid transition to a very high propor-
tion of renewable fuels: gasoline would have to be 25% ethanol by 2022.68 But
conventional automobiles are not designed to run on ethanol blends greater
than 10%; using higher concentrations could void customers' manufacturer car
warranties.69 This 10% upper limit creates a "blend wall" which limits ethanol
sales to about 15 billion gallons annually at current levels of gasoline consump-
68. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD: ISSUES FOR 2014 AND BE-
YOND (2014), https://perma.cc/2AZA-4JMX. ("[The Energy Independence and Security
Act]'s growing requirements for the total gallons of renewable fuels to be used each year,
combined with a projected decline in gasoline use, suggest that the average concentration of
ethanol in gasoline would have to rise to well above that 10 percent 'blend wall,' potentially
increasing to about 25 percent by 2022."); BRENT D. YACOBUCCI, CONG. RES. SERV.,
R40445, INTERMEDIATE-LEVEL BLENDS OF ETHANOL IN GASOLINE, AND THE ETHA-
NOL "BLEND WALL" 3 (2010), http://perma.cc/9M6R-LXTG.
69. YACOBUCCI, supra note 68, at 5 ("Second, automakers currently warranty their vehicles to
operate on ethanol/gasoline blends up to 10%. While there is data to suggest that newer
vehicles could be operated reliably on higher levels of ethanol without modification, no
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FIGURE 3. PROJECTED U.S. GASOLINE CONSUMPTION HAS FALLEN
RAPIDLY OVER THE PAST DECADE
US. Consumption of Motor Gasoline, 1950-2030
Million Barrels per Day Actual AEO Projections14 1
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tion.7 0 There are a limited number of "flex-fuel" vehicles that can use ethanol
blends over 10%, which means the blend wall is not an absolute cap, but the
Renewable Fuel Standard demands volumes that reach 15 billion gallons in
2012 and escalate dramatically after that."1 In 2016, the statute requires fuel
retailers to sell 22.25 billion gallons of renewable fuel; hitting that target would
require either radical shifts in U.S. energy markets and infrastructure or point-
less combustion of billions of gallons of ethanol.7 2
At the same time, renewable fuel producers have not been able to produce
nearly as much cellulosic biofuel as the Energy Independence and Security Act
requires. The Act placed great hope in this subcategory of renewable fuel,
which is made from sources such as grass, trees, and agricultural wastes that
have a smaller impact on the environment than corn." The statute required 500
million gallons of cellulosic biofuel in 2012 and 16 billion gallons by 2022.74
But zero gallons were produced in 2012 and the U.S. now projects that even by
2022, just 327 million gallons will be produced-about 2% of what the statute
requires for that year.75 These two practical challenges present a classic regula-
tor's dilemma: according to the oil industry, the renewable fuel volumes re-
quired by the statute are simply infeasible.7 6
Facing these practical challenges to the statute, EPA's Renewable Fuel
Standard proposal for 2014 effectively waved the white flag. Although the stat-
ute mandated an increase in renewable fuels from 16.55 billion gallons to 18.15
billion gallons, as shown in Figure 4, EPA proposed to decrease the renewable
fuel requirement to 15.21 billion gallons, asserting that it had authority to
waive the statutory requirement to avoid the blend wall.7 EPA also proposed
mandating just 17 million gallons of cellulosic ethanol,79 which is about 1% of
the 1.75 billion gallons mandated by the law.s0 EPA's retreat from the statutory
goals has caused a furious controversy that ultimately pushed EPA to delay its
laws place some limits on the ability to retail blends of more than 10% ethanol, and U.S. fuel
distribution infrastructure is often not set up for high-ethanol blends. Id. at 5-6.
70. Id. at 5 (providing approximations from 2008).
71. Id. at 2; see also supra note 55.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(i)(I).
73. YACOBUCCI, supra note 68, at 1.
74. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(i)(III).
75. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 68, at 6-7.
76. See infra Part IV.A.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(i)(I).
78. 2014 Standards for the Renewable Fuel Standard Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 71,732, 71,734
(proposed Nov. 29, 2013) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80) (noting that EPA has author-
ity to waive the requirements under 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(7)(A), which allows EPA, in con-
sultation with the Departments of Agriculture and Energy, to waive volume requirements if
"[tlhere is inadequate domestic supply," and arguing that even though the U.S. could pro-
duce more corn ethanol, domestic supply is "inadequate" under the statute because of infra-
structure constraints that limit supply of ethanol to consumers). EPA issued a modified
proposal in mid-2015 that would require slightly more ethanol, but still nothing close to the
statutory standards. Renewable Fuel Standard Program: Standards for 2014, 2015, and 2016
and Biomass-Based Diesel Volume for 2017, 80 Fed. Reg. 33,100 (June 10, 2015).
79. 2014 Standards for the Renewable Fuel Standard Program, 78 Fed. Reg. at 71,734.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(i)(lll).
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2014 standard-instead, it now aims to resolve this intractable dispute in time
to set a three-year standard for 2014-2016 sometime in 2015.11
FIGURE 4. EPA CHANGES TO RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD TARGETS
2011-201682
2011 Law 0___ L Conventional (corn) rule
2011 Rule 1_ 0 Conventional (corn) law
R Cellulosic rule
2012 Law _II g Cellulosic Ia
2012 Rule ///l E Biodiesel rule
E_ Biodiesel law
2013 Law
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2013 RuleI-- _ . I
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81. Delay in Issuing 2014 Standards for the Renewable Fuel Standard Program, 79 Fed. Reg.
73,007, 71,734 (proposed Dec. 9, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80) (delaying stan-
dards on the basis that "[t]he proposal has generated significant comment and controversy,
particularly about how volumes should be set in light of lower gasoline consumption than
had been forecast at the time that the Energy Independence and Security Act was enacted,
and whether and on what basis the statutory volumes should be waived" and highlighting
that "commenters expressed concerns regarding the proposal's ability to ensure continued
progress towards achieving the volumes of renewable fuel targeted by the statute"); Renewa-
ble Fuel Standard Program: Standards for 2014, 2015, and 2016 and Biomass-Based Diesel
Volume for 2017, 80 Fed. Reg. 33,100 (June 10, 2015); Matthew Philips, Ethanol, Fighting
for Its Lzfe, Gets a Temporary Reprieve, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 24, 2014, http://perma.cc/J7ZR-
B8VZ (reporting the "deep lobbying effort" on both sides, and quoting ethanol spokesman
saying waiver "would've ripped the guts out of the RFS").
82. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(i); Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: 2011 Renewable Fuel
Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 76,790 (Dec. 9, 2010); Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives:
2012 Renewable Fuel Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 1320 (Jan. 9, 2012); Regulation of Fuels and
Fuel Additives: 2013 Renewable Fuel Standards, 78 Fed. Reg. 49,794 (Aug. 15, 2013);
Renewable Fuel Standard Program: Standards for 2014, 2015, and 2016 and Biomass-Based
Diesel Volume for 2017, 80 Fed. Reg. 33,100 (June 10, 2015).
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III. THE METHODOLOGY: COMPARING STATEMENTS TO Two
AUDIENCES
This study reports a new methodology for comparing statements on the
same topic to two audiences. Public companies are hardly the only actors that
face what this article labels the "two-audience problem." These problems are
ubiquitous in principal-agent relationships. For example, an agent that wants to
facilitate a transaction may hope that both the buyer and seller think they are
receiving a one-sided deal." Or a head-of-state may want to signal to an inter-
national audience that a negotiated settlement is the least she could grudgingly
accept, while signalling to a domestic audience that the settlement is a splendid
victory and cause for rejoicing.8 4
There are very few previous attempts to empirically study the results of
this two-audience problem through a comparison of statements to both audi-
ences on the same topic. The most significant is a study by Marlene Fiol that
compares forest product industry letters to shareholders with internal planning
documents during a period of upheaval for the industry." This study, however,
does not match documents that discuss the same issue for comparison, and it
only scores the corporate statements for general attributes such as positive-ver-
sus-negative and controlled-versus-helpless framings.86
The ubiquity of the two-audience problem and the dearth of empirical
studies on its effects may be a function of the difficulty of constructing a test for
inconsistency. Most actors facing a two-audience problem are smart enough to
avoid direct factual contradictions. Instead, actors resolve two-audience
problems through differential emphasis, using selective omission, deliberate
ambiguity, and exaggeration. Even Lee lacocca's statement that the Clean Air
Act "could prevent continued production of automobiles"" does not technically
contradict his contemporaneous statement that the "industry will continue to
grow."" He may have thought that although the Act could shut down the car
industry, and should be seen as a "threat to . . . every person in America,"" his
warnings would ensure that its implementation would be altered so that the
83. As just one example, the SEC famously charged Goldman Sachs with defrauding investors
for matching a hedge fund that wanted to bet against specific mortgage-backed securities
with other clients who were unaware that the hedge fund was choosing securities to short.
Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges Goldman Sachs with Fraud in Struc-
turing and Marketing of CDO Tied to Subprime Mortgages (Apr. 16, 2010), http://perma
.cc/S94D-VFSH.
84. See James D. Fearon, Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,
88 AM. POLL Sci. REv. 577, 581 (1994) ("Leaders engaged in disputes appear to worry
about both international and domestic audiences.").
85. C. Marlene Fiol, Corporate Communications: Comparing Executives' Private and Public State-
ments, 38 ACAD. MGMT. J. 522, 527-28 (1995) (describing methodology).
86. See id. at 528-32 (finding that corporations were more likely to identify changing circum-
stances as risks in communications to investors and more likely to identify statements as
opportunities in internal communications).
87. Women's Suffrage, supra note 1.
88. FORD MOTOR CO., supra note 2, at 3.
89. Women's Suffrage, supra note 1.
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industry could keep growing. Indeed, his reassurance was specifically predicated
on the political strength of the auto industry-the fact that "people everywhere
place a high value on the individual mobility" 90-and the auto industry did, at
key moments, convince EPA to delay implementation of some of the standards
he feared.91 So although his statements were so inconsistent that they would
leave polar opposite impressions on a listener, they do not involve the kind of
factual or quantitative contradiction that is easily tested.92 Thus, testing a two-
audience problem for inconsistency means detecting exaggeration, ambiguity,
and omission.93
To tease out differential emphases, this study catalogues each statement
and prediction about the Renewable Fuel Standard made by each of the thirty-
six companies represented in the fifty-six comment 10-K pairings that were
filed from 2010 to 2013. This study compares each year's comments with the
first Form 10-K that the company filed after that year's standard was finalized.
Companies must file Form 10-K within sixty to ninety days of the end of their
fiscal years, which means that most companies file in March.9 4 So far, EPA has
never finalized a rule that prescribed significantly different volumes than those
proposed." So by the time each company filed its 10-K disclosure, the rule that
the company had commented on had come into effect. 96 Thus, there are fifty-
six matched pairs of comments to EPA and Form 10-K securities disclosures.
90. FoRD MOTOR Co., supra note 2, at 3.
91. Lee, supra note 4, at 251 ("As a result, the timetable for the attainment of the emission
reductions was, therefore, delayed several times.").
92. And, in addition to deceiving regulators, technically accurate statements may still be actiona-
ble under securities laws. Omnicare, Inc., et al. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus.
Pension Fund et al., 135 S. Ct. 1318, 1331 (2015) ("[L]iteral accuracy is not enough: an
issuer must as well desist from misleading investors by saying one thing and holding back
another.").
93. The differences between statements to different audiences in a two-audience problem might
be thought of as analogous to "acoustic separation" in the law where different audiences
receive different messages, which serves instrumental goals. See generally Meir Dan-Cohen,
Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HAv. L. REv.
625 (1984) (arguing that public focus on conduct rules and official focus on decision rules
may accommodate competing values).
94. SEc. & EXCH. COMM'N, Fo~mv 10-K, GENERAL INSTRUCTIONs A(1), https://perma.cc/
6YAT-QQPA.
95. Compare Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: 2013 Renewable Fuel Standards, 78 Fed.
Reg. 49,794, 49,798 (Aug. 15, 2013), with Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: 2013
Renewable Fuel Standards, 78 Fed. Reg. 9282, 9283 (proposed Feb. 7, 2013); compare Regu-
lation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: 2012 Renewable Fuel Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 1320 (Jan.
9, 2012) with Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: 2012 Renewable Fuel Standards, 76
Fed. Reg. 38,844, 38,848 (proposed July 1, 2011); compare Regulation of Fuels and Fuel
Additives: 2011 Renewable Fuel Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 76,790 (Dec. 9, 2010), with Regu-
lation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: 2011 Renewable Fuel Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 42,238,
42,242 (proposed July 20, 2010); compare Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Changes
to Renewable Fuel Standard Program, 75 Fed. Reg. 14,670 (March 26, 2010), with Regula-
tion of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Changes to Renewable Fuel Standard Program, 74 Fed.
Reg. 24,904, 25,040 (proposed May 26, 2009).
96. The one exception to this rule is the 2013 standard, which was not finalized until August
2013. Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: 2013 Renewable Fuel Standards, 78 Fed.
Reg. 49,794, 49,798 (Aug. 15, 2013). Nevertheless, by 2013, the Agency had established a
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The study uses fifty-nine codes to encompass every kind of prediction and
statement related to the Renewable Fuel Standard.97 These codes were chosen
to represent each kind of statement that companies made about the Renewable
Fuel Standard. The direct focus of this study was on those codes that predicted
an impact on the company from the standard because those codes appeared
both in company comments and company 10-K disclosures." Other types of
coded statements appeared only in comments, such as company positions on
how provisions of the Renewable Fuel Standard should be modified or re-
tained," endorsements of the comments of a trade association, 0 and predic-
tions about how the Renewable Fuel Standard would affect stakeholders apart
from the company. 01 Still other coded statements appeared only in securities
pattern of sticking to its proposed volumes, so companies probably would not have expected
major deviations in the final rule.
97. These codes are reported in Appendix A. Some sample coded statements are reported in
Appendix B. This study is a form of content analysis, which is the "systematic, objective,
quantitative analysis of message characteristics." K.A. NEUENDORF, THE CONTENT ANAL-
Ysis GUIDEBOOK 1 (2002). Content analysis is a commonly used technique that categorizes
language so that contextual inferences can be made. KLAUS KRIPPENDORFF, CONTENT
ANALYSIS: AN INTRODUCTION TO ITS METHODOLOGY 21 (2004). While this methodol-
ogy is used widely in the social sciences, it is also used in legal research. In particular, it is
often used in analyzing judicial opinions, see Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic
Content Analysis offudicial Opinion, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 63, 64 (2008), or tribunal decisions,
see Gus Van Harten, Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical Adjudication: An Empirical Study of
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 211, 233-36 (2012), or other out-
comes, see generally D. Freelon, ReCal: Intercoder Reliability Calculation as a Web Service, 5
INT'L J. INTERNET Sci. 20 (2010), discourse, see Richard Jochelson et al., Searching and
Seizing After 9/11: Developing and Applying Empirical Methodology to Measure judicial Output
in the Supreme Court's Section 8 Jurisprudence, 35 DALHOUSIE LJ. 179, 195-99 (2012), or
attitude of lawyers, see Peter Mercer et al., The Practice ofEthical Precepts: Dissecting Decision-
Making by Lawyers, 9 CAN. J.L. & JuRIs. 141, 144-48 (1996), and judges, see generally C.L.
OSTBERG & MATTHEW E. WETSTEIN, ArTUDINAL DECISION MAKING IN THE Su-
PREME COURT OF CANADA (2007), or the portrayal of legal issues in the media, see generally
FLORIAN SAUVAGEAU ET AL., THE LAST WORD: MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF CANADA (2006). See also ROBERT M. LAWLESS ET AL., EMPIRICAL METHODS
IN LAW (2010).
98. Codes 201-208 recorded positive impact predictions and codes 301-308 recorded negative
impact predictions. See infra app. A. The most common predictions described whether it is
feasible for companies to comply and whether the Renewable Fuel Standard increases or
decreases certainty for companies. Predictions also included statements that the Renewable
Fuel Standard would increase or decrease the company's profits, and cost of production as
well as predictions that it would impact the company's customer demand, return on invest-
ment, and ability to maintain or increase its facilities' capacity. See https://perma.cc/PMD4-
ET6Z. Because these comments describe impacts of the Renewable Fuel Standards on the
company's financial position, rather than aspects of the Standard that should be changed,
they are relevant to both EPA and investors.
99. Codes 101-104 show whether a company supports the Renewable Fuel Standard and how, if
at all, it would suggest changing the timing of the rule and the targets for advanced biofuel,
cellulosic biofuel, biomass-based diesel, and total biofuel. See infra app. A.
100. Codes 901-907.
101. Codes 401-407 recorded positive impact predictions and codes 501-507 recorded negative
impact predictions about how the Renewable Fuel Standard will affect actors outside the
company. These codes identified statements about how the Renewable Fuel Standard would
benefit or harm job growth, the domestic and international economy, energy independence,
energy supply, and food and commodity prices. See infra app. A.
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disclosures, such as positive and negative impacts from climate regulation in
general, or other descriptions of regulatory risk that may be meant to include
the Renewable Fuel Standard, but do not single it out.o2
The fifty-six paired submissions contained over 10,000 pages and revealed
739 coded statements related to the Renewable Fuel Standard.103 The most
crucial codes were 218 separate predictions about how the Renewable Fuel
Standard would affect the company making the statement. To determine how
companies used different emphasis in the different settings, the author calcu-
lated how many separate negative impacts each company predicted it would
suffer due to the Renewable Fuel Standard in its comments and how many it
predicted it would suffer in its 10-K. 104
The thity-six companies were analyzed as two distinct sample groups. The
first group comprises anti-ethanol companies that oppose the Renewable Fuel
Standard. The second group comprises pro-ethanol groups that support the
Renewable Fuel Standard. The companies were classified into one of the two
groups based on the number of positive and negative impact predictions identi-
fied in their communications to EPA and their statements of support or oppo-
sition to the Standard.
Companies had to be separated into two groups because these groups face
dramatically different incentives in their comments and securities disclosures.
As noted, companies that perceive the Renewable Fuel Standard as a threat will
want to warn the regulator that the Renewable Fuel Standard places them in
danger, but will want to reassure investors. In contrast, groups that favor the
Renewable Fuel Standard face more similar incentives in the two settings: they
want to tell both regulators and investors about the benefits that will flow from
the Renewable Fuel Standard. For simplicity, the companies that view the Re-
newable Fuel Standard as a risk are also referred to here as "anti-ethanol" com-
panies and "oil companies" because most are oil companies that oppose ethanol
mandates, although some are companies that manufacture products that run on
motor fuels,' and some of the oil companies have side businesses in biofuels.
Similarly, companies that favor the Renewable Fuel Standard are sometimes
referred to as "ethanol companies" even though some, such as Deere & Com-
102. Codes 601 and 701.
103. Full dataset and calculations are available at https://perma.cc/PMD4-ET6Z and https://
perma.cc/P7NM-XQQ3.
104. To focus on separate predictions, each code was counted just once per document. For exam-
ple, if a company stated that the Renewable Fuel Standard was infeasible in the introduction,
body, and conclusion of its comment, those statements were counted only as one prediction.
It is possible that repeating a prediction multiple times in a document might leave a margin-
ally stronger impression than a single clear prediction, but the study assumes that a warning
is stronger if it comes with many different arguments about how the regulation will harm the
industry. Thus, the unit of analysis is the number of logically separable arguments about the
impact of the standard. This approach gives the same weight to repetitive or long-winded
recitations of an argument as to concise and pointed versions of the same argument. That is,
the study measures the strength of the warning by identifying how many distinct negative
impacts the company predicts it will suffer because of the regulation.
105. These companies are Boeing, Caterpillar, and Ford. See supra note 64.
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pany, which manufactures agricultural equipment, are merely companies that
benefit from the ethanol industry indirectly.
The comments and Form 10-K of all thirty-six companies were then
coded by one coder.106 Paired t-tests and a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test were
performed to determine whether there was a significant difference between how
many company-specific risks and benefits were identified in the companies'
comments to EPA and their Form 10-K disclosures to investors."'
IV. RESULTS: OIL COMPANIES WARN REGULATORS
AND REASSURE INVESTORS
The study confirms the hypothesis that oil companies tell regulators that
the Renewable Fuel Standard will harm them financially while simultaneously
assuring investors that the company is well-positioned to comply. When these
companies submitted comments, they identified more than three times as many
ways that the standard would harm them as were identified in their contempo-
raneous securities disclosures.
Some oil companies even identified the Renewable Fuel Standard as a
boon in their 10-K disclosures and as a bane in their comments. For example,
Shell told EPA that without major changes the Renewable Fuel Standard
would "limit the supply of gasoline,"0 ' which would prevent it from serving
customers and cause "severe economic harm."0 9 In contrast, the only thing its
106. A random sample of forty-eight passages that contained seventy-four coded portions was
chosen from both comments and Form 10-K from the 2013 sample to assess intercoder
reliability of the coding scheme. Two testers individually tested the codes. The intercoder
agreement between the two coders from the project was 83.8%, with a Krippendorff alpha =
0.83. See KRIPPENDORFF, supra note 97, at 227. These are within typical acceptable in-
tercoder reliability rates for content analysis. See NEUENDORF, supra note 97, at 143. In this
study, the challenges to intercoder agreements include the high number of codes (fifty-nine
in total), the technical nature of the Renewable Fuel Standard regulation, and the complex
arguments sometimes used in the documents analyzed.
107. Both tests are frequently used for determining whether the means of two populations differ
significantly. Michael P. Fay & Michael A. Proschan, Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney or t-test? On
Assumptions for Hypothesis Tests and Multiple Interpretations ofDecision Rules, 4 STAT. SURV.
1, 1 (2010) ("For example, often a researcher wants to know which of two groups generally
has the larger responses, and either a t-test or a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test could be
acceptable."). The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is generally thought more appropriate for
variables that, like the number of predictions reported here, may not be filly continuous or
normally distributed. See generally H.B. Mann & D.R. Whitney, On a Test of Whether One of
Two Random Variables Is Stochastically Larger than the Other, 18 ANN. MATH. STAT. 50
(1947). Statisticians, however, have not reached complete consensus. See Fay & Proschan,
supra at 9 ("The researcher may think the choice between the Wilcoxon rank sum/Mann-
Whitney U test (WMW test) and the t-test depends on the results of a test of normality" but
"the issue is not so simple.").
108. Shell Oil Products US, Comment Letter on Proposed 2013 Renewable Fuel Standards Rule
(Apr. 5, 2013), http://perma.cc/8F4M-7KAR ("If the blend wall is not appropriately ad-
dressed, it will limit the supply of gasoline and diesel fuel and have significant adverse im-
pacts on consumers.").
109. Id. at 3 ("EPA should use its general waiver authority to adjust the standards down to rea-
sonably achievable levels to avoid severe economic harm.").
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parent company told its investors about the Renewable Fuel Standard was that
the standard would boost biofuels, which it implied was good because in addi-
tion to its primary business as an oil company it was also one of the "largest
biofuels producers."no
In contrast, companies that favor the Renewable Fuel Standard, such as
ethanol interests, actually identified slightly more impacts from the Renewable
Fuel Standard in their 10-K disclosures. This confirms that the result for oil
companies is not driven by any inherent differences between the format of
comments and 10-K disclosures."' In fact, the ethanol company result is a kind
of flip-side of the oil company result; together these results suggest that oil
companies send inconsistent messages because, unlike ethanol companies, they
face different incentives when they address these different audiences.
A. Oil Companies Identfiy Sign/icantly More Negative Impacts in Their
Comments than in Their 10-K Disclosures
The companies with a negative view of the Renewable Fuel Standard
identified significantly more negative impacts from the standard in their com-
ments to EPA than in their comments to investors. Figure 5 shows the average
number of negative comments that these companies reported during the entire
period studied. Of the sixteen companies with a negative view of the Renewable
Fuel Standard, thirteen identified more negative impacts in their comments to
EPA than in their securities disclosures to investors.
110. RoYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC, ANNUAL REPORT (FoRM 20-F) 50 (2013) ("The interna-
tional market for biofuels is growing, driven largely by the introduction of new energy poli-
cies in Europe and the USA that call for more renewable, lower-carbon fuels for
transport. . . . We are one of the world's largest biofuels producers.").
111. That is, this result confirms that there is no inherent tendency for comments to focus more
on impacts to companies than 10-K disclosures. If there was such a tendency, oil company
comments might contain more impact predictions even though oil companies were sending
similar messages in each forum. But the prevalence of impact predictions in ethanol com-
pany 10-K disclosures acts as a control that rejects this alternative explanation of the discrep-
ancy in oil company disclosures. And this explanation-that securities disclosures inherently
say less about how regulation may impact a company-seems implausible anyway because,
unlike comments, 10-K disclosures are required to include comments about risk to the com-
pany in particular. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.503 (2013) ("Where appropriate, provide under the
caption "Risk Factors" a discussion of the most significant factors that make the offering
speculative or risky. . . . Do not present risks that could apply to any issuer or any offering.
Explain how the risk affects the issuer or the securities being offered."). By contrast, com-
ments are designed to focus on public costs and benefits of a rule. See supra note 10 and
accompanying text.
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FIGURE 5. AVERAGE NEGATIVE IMPACTS IDENTIFIED BY COMPANIES
THAT PERCEIVE THE RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD AS A RISK
IN COMMENTS AND SECURITIES DISCLOSURES FILED
FROM 2010-2013
l Statements to EPA
U Statements to Investors
6
2
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Some companies said positive things about the impact of the rule, which
are shown as negative in Figure 5.112 As mentioned, Shell told EPA that the
Renewable Fuel Standard could cause severe economic harm by limiting gaso-
line sales, but only told its investors that the Renewable Fuel Standard could
boost its biofuel sales.' These positive mentions also included assertions that
complying with the rule is feasible. For example, in its Form 10-K for 2010,
ConocoPhillips said, "We have met the increased requirements to date while
establishing implementation, operating and capital strategies, along with ad-
vanced technology development, to address projected future requirements."114
By contrast, in that same year, ConocoPhillips endorsed the comments of the
112. The two companies that suggested the rule was, if anything, a benefit also did not hedge
their bets by suggesting any ways that the rule might harm them. See CONOcOPHILLIPS,
ANNUAL REPORT (FoRM 10-K) 58 (Feb. 17, 2010); SHELL OIL COMPANY, ANNUAL RE-
PORT (FoRM 20-F) 84 (Feb. 24, 2013).
113. Shell Oil Company, Comments on 2013 Renewable Fuel Standard Proposal, EPA-HQ-
OAR-2012-0546-0085, 3 (2012); SHELL OIL COMPANY, ANNUAL REPORT (FoRM 20-F)
84 (2013).
114. CONocoPHILLIPs, ANNUAL REPORT (FoRM 10-K) 58 (Feb. 17, 2010).
72 [Vol. 40
How Cheap Is Corporate Talk?
National Petrochemical and Refiner's Association," which stated plainly that
the standard, as planned, was "infeasible."116
As shown in Figure 6, the average company that opposed the Renewable
Fuel Standard identified almost three specific ways (2.78) that the standard
would harm the company in each of its comments. In contemporaneously filed
10-K disclosures, the average company identified less than one way (0.87) that
the Renewable Fuel Standard might harm the company and its investors. A
paired t-test and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test both confirm that this re-
sult is highly significant at P = 0.003 and P = 0.002, respectively.
FIGURE 6. REGULATORY IMPACT PREDICTION FROM SIXTEEN COMPANIES
THAT OPPOSED THE RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD
Comments 10-K
Negative impacts per company statement 2.78 0.87
P = 0.002 (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test)
Studying individual years gives similar results, although the smaller num-
ber of observations reduces the statistical power of the dataset. For example, in
2013, seven public oil companies filed comments on the Renewable Fuel Stan-
dard. On average, these comments identified exactly 4 negative impacts from
the standard. By contrast, contemporaneous securities disclosures identified
only 1.14 negative impacts from the Renewable Fuel Standard. This difference
is significant at P = 0.020 under the paired t-test and P = 0.032 under the
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test."' As shown in Figure 7, in 2013 all but one oil
company identified more negative impacts in their comments than in their se-
curities disclosures, and that company, BP, did not identify any impact from
the Renewable Fuel Standard in either forum. As it faces the regulator's di-
115. ConocoPhillips, Comments on 2010 Renewable Fuel Standard Proposal (Sept. 25, 2009),
http://perma.cc/5XCR-SXHX ("ConocoPhillips is a member of the American Petroleum
Institute and the National Petrochemical and Refiner's Association and generally support the
comments submitted by both associations.").
116. National Petrochemical and Refiner's Association, Comments on 2010 Renewable Fuel
Standard (Sept. 25, 2009), http://perma.cc/D5VV-DWAC ("The RFS2 program should
begin on January 1, 2011; January 1, 2010 implementation is infeasible.").
117. As for the other years, in 2010, fourteen oil companies filed comments on the standard,
which identified 2.79 negative impacts on average; contemporaneous 10-K statements iden-
tified only 0.86 negative impacts on average. Using the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test this
difference is significant at P = 0.006. In 2010, nineteen ethanol companies commented on
the standard, which identified 0.12 positive impacts on average; contemporaneous 10-K
statements identified 0.53 positive impacts on average. Using the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney
test this difference is also significant at P = 0.045.
The other years did not provide enough paired observations for a meaningful comparison
of comments and securities disclosures for the individual year standing alone. In 2011, only
one oil company commented to EPA on the standard. In 2011, 2012, and 2013, only two,
three, and four ethanol companies commented, respectively.
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lemma, EPA is hearing a very different story from the story heard by oil com-
pany investors.
FIGURE 7. NEGATIVE IMPACTS IDENTIFIED BY COMPANIES OPPOSED TO
THE RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD IN COMMENTS
AND SECURITIES DISCLOSURES
O Statements to EPA




B. Ethanol Companies Identify Slightly Fewer Positive Impacts From the
Renewable Fuel Standard in Their Comments Than
in Their 10-K Reports
Companies that favor the Renewable Fuel Standard appear slightly more
eager to brag about its positive impact to their investors than to regulators. As
shown in Figure 8, nine out of twenty companies identified more positive im-
pacts in their 10-K submissions. Nine more companies identified the same
number of impacts in both settings, and two companies identified more positive
impacts in their comments." The impact mentioned most frequently in the
Form 10-K is that the Renewable Fuel Standard will increase demand for the
company's product.
118. As with the figure for oil companies, there are some negative figures on this graph. This is
because some companies, such as DuPont, felt that EPA's untimely proposals were making
the standard difficult to meet even for the companies it favored. See DuPont Applied Bios-
ciences, Comments on 2010 Renewable Fuel Standard Proposal (Sept. 25, 2009), http://per
ma.cc/SD25-CFJX ("Given the complexity of EPA's effort, and the many areas still in need
of clarification, we respectfully suggest that the RFS2 program effective date be delayed until
January 1, 2011, to allow additional time for refinement and to give regulated parties an
opportunity to prepare adequately.").
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FIGURE 8. POSITIVE IMPACTS IDENTIFIED BY COMPANIES THAT SUPPORT
THE RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD IN COMMENTS
AND FORM 10-K
E Statements to EPA





As shown in Figure 9, the average company identified just 0.21 positive
impacts to the company in its submissions to EPA. In their 10-K submissions,
the average company made 0.58 positive impact predictions. This small differ-
ence is on the cusp of statistical significance: it would be significant at a P =
0.052 level under the paired t-test and at a P = 0.054 level under the Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney test.
FIGURE 9. REGULATORY IMPACT PREDICTION FROM TWENTY
COMPANIES THAT PERCEIVE THE RENEWABLE FUEL
STANDARD AS A BENEFIT
Comments 10-K
Positive impacts per company statement 0.21 0.58
P = 0.054 (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test)
V. How SECURITIES DISCLOSURES CAN BE USED TO ASSESS THE
ACCURACY OF WARNINGS IN REGULATORY COMMENTS
AND VICE VERSA
The approach developed here will be a crucial tool for environmental regu-
lators, public and private enforcers of securities disclosures, and corporate coun-
sel. Regulators can use securities disclosures as a reality check on corporate
predictions of harm. The SEC and private investors can use securities law to
push companies to disclose all regulatory risks that they have identified in regu-
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latory comments. And corporate counsel can compare public company com-
ments with securities disclosures to ensure that the company is giving a
coherent, accurate, and credible picture of the company's exposure to regulatory
risk.
A. Environmental Regulators Should Assess the Accuracy of Comments by
Comparing Them with Contemporaneous Securities Disclosures
Environmental regulators should use the approach developed here, com-
paring the comments they receive with companies' securities disclosures, to gain
a more realistic view of the economic harm that their regulations might cause.
Regulators cannot ignore corporate comments because setting technology-
based or feasibility-driven standards requires massive amounts of private infor-
mation best known by these companies.119 And, as the Renewable Fuel Stan-
dard's cellulosic ethanol targets make plain, sometimes a statutory mandate is
truly impossible to achieve with current technology. But, as this study demon-
strates, comments from private companies can present an exaggerated picture of
the cost of regulation.
Regulators can retain the benefit of private information, but improve its
accuracy, by matching comments with contemporaneous securities disclo-
sures. 12 0 Even when comments and securities disclosures are not technically in-
consistent, they often leave very different impressions about how feasible a
proposed rule will be for industry. Thus, securities disclosures can be an inter-
pretive aid for regulators, helping them suss out which regulations actually may
be infeasible.
As an example of how this would work, consider the current controversy
over EPA's Clean Power Plan for power sector carbon emissions. In November
2014, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, North America's
energy watchdog,12 1 warned that states might need more compliance time than
EPA was allowing for the Clean Power Plan to ensure that utilities can main-
119. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 15, at 1337 (writing that these types of standard "involv[e]
the centralized determination of complex scientific, engineering, and economic issues re-
garding the feasibility of controls on hundreds of thousands of pollution sources" and "[s]uch
determinations impose massive information-gathering burdens on administrators, and pro-
vide a fertile ground for complex litigation in the form of massive adversary rulemaking
proceedings and protracted judicial review"); see also supra notes 11-20 and accompanying
text.
120. This study's methodology relies on securities disclosures from the following year because, by
that point, the rule has generally been finalized, so the company cannot claim it thought the
rule would change after proposal. Regulators, by contrast, will have to rely on contemporane-
ous securities disclosures in considering whether to modify their proposed rules. But these
contemporaneous disclosures, filed after the rule is proposed but before it is finalized, should
address the impact of the proposed rule according to SEC guidance. Commission Guidance
Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg. 6290, 6296 (Feb. 8, 2010)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 211, 231, 241).
121. The North American Electric Reliability Corporation, known as NERC, is a public-private
hybrid organization partially supervised by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, U. ILL. L. REv. 1,
35-44 (2014) (providing an excellent summary of the evolution of NERC).
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tain the reliability of electricity distribution.1 22 In February 2015, a consulting
group responded, claiming that the energy watchdog's report exaggerated the
risk that EPA's plan posed to reliability.123 But electric utilities have echoed the
report's concern, telling EPA that its plan would endanger electric reliability;
for example, Ameren, a major Missouri and Illinois utility, cited the report
extensively in a white paper on the Clean Power Plan.124
Is EPA's proposed Clean Power Plan timeline too rapid to ensure reliabil-
ity? The agency can calibrate how seriously it takes utility company comments
by examining the securities disclosures that most companies filed in the first
months of 2015. Taking the example of Ameren, the company's 10-K does say
that it is "evaluating the proposed Clean Power Plan and the potential impact
to its operations, including those related to electric system reliability."' 2 5 So
Ameren is considering the issue, but this statement is somewhat less stark than
the white paper, which said that the Clean Power Plan's "interim targets ...
jeopardiz[e] the reliability of the electricity supply and risk[] economic disrup-
tion."1 26 The Form 10-K, like the white paper, also states clearly that the Clean
Power Plan imposes a substantial economic risk on the utility, which may sug-
gest that this concern is genuine, whether or not it is accurate.'2 A comprehen-
sive review of utility 10-K forms would reveal how many utilities truly shared
these concerns.
122. N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., POTENTIAL RELIABILITY IMPACTS OF EPA's PRO-
POSED CLEAN POWER PLAN: INITIAL RELIABILITY REVIEW 2 (2014), http://perma.cc/
84TR-JF2R ("More time for [Clean Power Plan] implementation may be needed to accom-
modate reliability enhancements . . . . [Compliance through] resource additions, as well as
the expected transmission enhancements, may represent a significant reliability challenge
given the constrained time period for implementation.").
123. JURGEN WEISS ET AL., THE BRATTLE GROUP, EPA's CLEAN POWER PLAN AND RELIA-
BILITY: ASSESSING NERC's INITIAL RELIABILITY REvIEw iv-v (2015), http://perma.cc/
3W3N-5J3X ("[L]egitimate arguments exist to counterbalance NERC's concerns in each
building block and ... as a result of these arguments (and the additional tools we outline as
options to counteract the issues raised by NERC) NERC's reliability concerns could be
partially or entirely mitigated.").
124. See, e.g., AMEREN, AMEREN's ALTERNATIVE TO THE EPA's PROPOSED GREENHOUSE
GAS RULES 7 (2015), https://perma.cc/X6K6-NJB9 ("The non-partisan North American
Electric Reliability Corporation ("NERC") has concluded that Missouri and Illinois could
fall below reserve margin standards deemed necessary to ensure reliability."); see also Herman
K. Trabish, Comments Are in on the EPA's Clean Power Plan: Utilities Say the Rules Go Too
Far, Too Fast, UTILITY DIVE (Dec. 2, 2014), http://perma.ce/9FTR-YDQX.
125. AMEREN, ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K), at 138 (Mar. 2, 2015), http://perma.cc/2XSL-
3RQP.
126. AMEREN, supra note 124, at 10.
127. AMEREN, supra note 125, at 138-39 ("As proposed, the Clean Power Plan would require the
states, including Missouri and Illinois, to submit compliance plans as early as 2016. The
states' compliance plans might require Ameren Missouri to construct natural gas-fired com-
bined cycle generation and renewable generation, at a currently estimated cost of approxi-
mately $2 billion by 2020, that Ameren Missouri believes would otherwise not be necessary
to meet the energy needs of its customers. Additionally, Missouri's implementation of the
proposed rules, if adopted, could result in the closure or alteration of the operation of some
of Ameren Missouri's coal and natural gas-fired energy centers, which could result in in-
creased operating costs or impairment of assets.").
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Regulators should also request that companies submit excerpts from their
securities disclosures that show exactly how seriously they take the threat of
regulation. The burden of this requirement would be minimal because compa-
nies have already drafted these disclosures. In fact, it would benefit corporate
counsel as a check to ensure that the company was sending out consistent
messages on the impact of regulation. 128 Regulators could simply offer to give
particular consideration to comments that were accompanied by these excerpts
from securities disclosures. No further sanction would be necessary;1 29 if a com-
pany failed to make this submission, a regulator could bolster its answer to the
comment by noting that it was unsupported by the company's own securities
disclosures.13 0
At the least, regulators could adopt this approach for major rules likely to
attract major comment and present the regulator's dilemma-that is, proposed
rules that a substantial portion of industry will claim are infeasible. Regulators
could also time proposals so that comment periods are contemporaneous with
most 10-K filings to allow the agency to cross-check company statements to
each audience.
B. Securities Regulators and Plaintifs' Counsel Can Use Comments on
Environmental Regulations to Audit the Completeness
of Securities Disclosures
Just as companies may exaggerate how much regulation will cost in their
comments, so too they may exaggerate how little regulation will cost in their
disclosures to investors. Securities regulators and plaintiffs' counsel can use this
study's approach to improve corporate disclosures, because they can use public
companies' comments to identify material risks absent from their securities dis-
closures. This could significantly strengthen the nascent movement to improve
companies' reporting of environmental risk."'
According to the SEC's binding guidance, a company must disclose how a
pending regulation will impact it unless the company determines it is not likely
128. See infra Part V.C.
129. Congress could also consider mandating a standard of reliability for predictions in comments
to regulators. But this seems unnecessary-an unreliable comment does little harm if regula-
tors and the public know it is unsupported. And there is little reason to think that unreliable
comments in rulemaking dockets, which Congress might control, would have any worse
impact than unreliable comments in public discussions, which it cannot.
130. Agencies already provide independent regulatory impact analyses that estimate the effects of
proposed regulations. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 6 (1994). This approach could
simply strengthen the agency's hand by revealing cases where industry counterarguments
were undercut by their own statements to investors.
131. See Nina Hart, Moving at a Glacial Pace: What Can State Attorneys General Do About SEC
Inattention to Nondisclosure of Financially Material Risks Arising from Climate Change?, 40
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 99, 111-15 (2015); see also JIM COBURN ET AL., DISCLOSING CLI-
MATE RISKS & OPPORTUNITIES IN SEC FILINGS: A GUIDE FOR CORPORATE EXEcu-
nvEs, ATTORNEYS & DIRECTORS 14 (2011), http://perma.cc/M5PM-ZSVZ.
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to be enacted or not likely to affect the company.13 2 So if a company tells regu-
lators that it will be negatively impacted by a proposed regulation, it must dis-
dose this risk unless it believes the regulation will not be enacted. During the
first four years of the new Renewable Fuel Standard, 2010-2013, which are the
years studied here, EPA finalized a renewable fuel standard each year that was
very similar to the proposal addressed by company comments. 3  Companies
would have a very difficult time arguing that it was unlikely that EPA would act
as it always had in the past.1 34
The SEC should insist that companies' securities disclosures include the
risks that they identify in their comments to regulators. The Commission is
under significant pressure from investor groups, state officials, and environmen-
tal activists that are dissatisfied with the currently meager disclosure of regula-
tory risk.135 The Commission should use its existing authority to enforce its
disclosure requirements through escalating sanctions beginning with comment
letters and progressing to enforcement actions."' The SEC could also consider
forming an interagency working group to identify severe examples of the regu-
lator's dilemma-that is, areas where industry complaints about proposed rules
have been particularly vociferous.' It could then focus on corporate statements
132. Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg.
6290, 6296 (Feb. 8, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R pts. 211, 231, 241) (noting that
"disclosure is required" of the effect of "pending legislation or regulation . . . [u]nless man-
agement determines that it is not reasonably likely to be enacted [or] determines that a
material effect is not reasonably likely").
133. See supra note 95.
134. Indeed, the 2011 and 2012 standards had already been finalized by the time companies made
their 10-K disclosures at the start of the year. Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: 2012
Renewable Fuel Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 1320 (Jan. 9, 2012); Regulation of Fuels and Fuel
Additives: 2011 Renewable Fuel Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 76,790 (Dec. 9, 2010).
135. See GARY SHORTER, CONG. REs. SERV., R42544, SEC CLIMATE CHANGE DISCLOSURE
GUIDANCE: AN OVERVIEW AND CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNs 6, 7 (2013) (reporting evi-
dence from "a nonprofit coalition of institutional investors, environmental organizations, and
other public interest groups" that corporations "needed more experience at communicating
the risks associated with climate change"). The world's largest proxy advisory firm, which
advises institutional shareholders on corporate governance, issued a report on the response to
SEC's guidance with a press release titled: "New ISS Corporate Services Report Highlights
Need for Improved Company Disclosure Per New SEC Climate Risk Disclosure Guide-
lines." Press Release, ISS Corporate Services (Oct. 12, 2010), http://perma.cc/ZG75-AT5T
(noting that "[o]nly 20% of companies cover all issues defined in the February 2010 SEC
climate risk guidelines in their most recent Form 10-K disclosure"). See also JIM COBURN &
JACKIE COOK, CERES, COOL RESPONSE: THE SEC & CORPORATE CLIMATE CHANGE
REPORTING 5 (Feb. 2014), http://perma.cc/X7JP-3NVL (criticizing the SEC for not doing
enough to enforce its environmental disclosure requirements and noting a sharp drop-off in
comment letters after SEC issued its guidance in 2010).
136. See Hansen, supra note 27, at 499. See also Petition for Interpretive Guidance on Climate
Risk Disclosure, File No. 4-547 at 10 (Sept. 18, 2007), http://perma.cc/Z4B7-3BUG (in-
vestor groups and state treasurers petitioning SEC to issue guidance on disclosing risk from
climate regulation and to "take action to ensure that [issuers] meet their obligations under
the securities laws and regulations").
137. This working group could build on similar efforts by the SEC and the Food and Drug
Administration, which have teamed up to ensure that drug manufacturers are not misleading
investors about their prospects of regulatory approval. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC and
FDA Take Steps to Enhance Inter-Agency Cooperation (Feb. 5, 2004), https://perma.cc/
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to investors in those areas to ensure that companies are equally frank with their
investors.
When a company is harmed by environmental regulations, 38 injured in-
vestors can also use company comments to show that companies' disclosures did
not present a complete picture of the company's exposure to regulatory risk.139
SEC Rule 10b-5 gives private plaintiffs a right of action to sue companies when
their securities disclosures contain misleading representations or omissions.140
Under the "fraud-on-the-market" theory adopted by the Supreme Court in Ba-
sic Inc. v. Levinson,141 these plaintiffs need not even show that they read and
relied on these disclosures, so long as they can show that they purchased stock
at an artificially inflated price caused by the misleading disclosure.1 42 By scruti-
nizing corporate comments, private plaintiffs can give public companies an in-
centive to make their securities disclosures consistent with their comments to
regulators.
C. Corporate Counsel Should Ensure Corporate Comments on Regulations Are
Consistent
If corporations' comments on public regulation can be compared to corpo-
rate securities disclosures, there is no longer any advantage to presenting incon-
sistent messages to the two audiences. Indeed, inconsistent messages could
create a lose-lose situation for a public company. If a proposed regulation is a
true threat to the company, and the company uses its comments to inform the
agency of the danger posed by the proposal, the agency may dismiss the com-
ments as cheap talk if they are not also reflected in securities disclosures. And if
the agency finalizes an unchanged regulation that harms the company, investors
will have evidence that the company gave incomplete securities disclosures,
which could result in liability for the company in a lawsuit under Rule 10b-5.
On the flip side, if a company believes that a proposed regulation is not a
true threat and follows the usual pattern of warning regulators and reassuring
4B3M-MGXE; Food & Drug Admin., FDA and SEC Work to Enhance Public's Protec-
tion from False and Misleading Statements (Feb. 5, 2004), http://perma.cc/WMN8-BAP6.
138. Company stocks respond to news regarding environmental regulation in both the short term
and long term. See, e.g., Vikash Ramiah et al., How Does the Stock Market React to the An-
nouncement of Green Policies?, 37 J. BANKING & FIN. 1747, 1750-51 (2013) (using event
study to show that oil and gas stocks, among others, lose value in response to the announce-
ment of environmental policies); Matt Phillips, Coal Stocks are Paying a Price for Environ-
mental Regulations, YAHOO FINANCE (Dec. 24, 2014), http://perma.cc/TDT2-8TAN.
139. One reason that private plaintiffs may not yet have taken advantage of this comparison is
that the U.S. government has just started providing easy access to comments in rulemaking
dockets over the past decade. See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3821-22 (Jan.
21, 2011) (mandating "timely online access to the rulemaking docket on regulations.gov");
Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future, 55 DuKE
L.J. 943, 946-47 (2006) (describing e-rulemaking initiative begun during Bush
Administration).
140. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975).
141. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
142. See id. at 244; see also Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2408-13
(2014) (declining to overrule Basic on this point).
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investors, it will still face negative consequences. The regulator will accurately
dismiss the comments as cheap talk, but when this judgment proves accurate,
the company will have lost credibility for its future regulatory submissions.143
And if, for some reason, the regulation proves more damaging than the com-
pany expected, the company comments, even if insincere, may be used against it
in a 10b-5 lawsuit.
To avoid liability and enhance the credibility of company comments on
regulation, corporate counsel should ensure that the company is not telling dif-
ferent audiences different stories about the potential impact of regulation.1 44
Now that a company's comments can be compared to its securities disclosures,
there is no advantage to inconsistency. Indeed, companies should consider vol-
untarily including relevant excerpts from their securities disclosures with their
comments to agencies to demonstrate how seriously they take the dangers of
overregulation that they are combating.1 45 Due to past exaggerations, regulators
may dismiss unsupported warnings. Companies can restore their credibility by
showing regulators that they take their warnings seriously enough to share them
with investors as well.
CONCLUSION
Two audiences-environmental regulators and investors-both need to
know how regulations may impact public companies. But when they face ad-
verse regulations, companies would like regulators to think the danger is severe
and would like investors to think the danger is manageable. Faced with this
two-audience problem, corporate talk is cheap: oil companies made very differ-
ent predictions about the impact of the Renewable Fuel Standard in their com-
ments to regulators and their securities disclosures to investors.
Fortunately, by measuring this discrepancy, this study will help regulators,
investors, and companies to cure it. Regulators should integrate review of secur-
ities disclosures into their rulemaking process to gain a more accurate picture of
the risks they are imposing on industry. Doing so will ease the regulator's di-
lemma of gauging the sincerity of corporate warnings. On the flip-side, securi-
ties regulators and investors should review comments on regulation to identify
regulatory risks that companies are not disclosing. Finally, corporate counsel
should anticipate this scrutiny by harmonizing the messages it sends in regula-
tory comments and securities disclosures.
143. Indeed, even now company comments are often not considered credible. See supra note 5 and
accompanying text.
144. One reason for inconsistent messages could be that different lawyers, and potentially outside
counsel, are drafting comments and securities disclosures. If this is the case, corporate coun-
sel will have to take extra precautions to ensure these different drafters produce consistent
messages.
145. For example, if a utility like Ameren wanted to convince EPA that its concerns about the
Clean Power Plan affecting reliability were sincere, it could file excerpts from its Form 10-K
disclosures in the Clean Power Plan docket.
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g. Increase cellulosicvolume standard
h. Decrease cellulosicvolume standard
i. Maintain cellulosic volume standard
j. Increase biodiesel volume standard [same as
k. Decrease biodiesel volume standard
1. Maintain biodiesel volume standard
104. EPA should issue proposal in a timely fashion
biomass-based diesel]
Positive impact predicton to the com- Neoative imnact nrediction to the com-
NB: The positive codes also apply if
the text first describes the positive
impact of the RFS to the company and
then went on to say that the repealing
of the RFS (or changes, and the lack of
enforcement) could have adverse
effects to the company.
For companies which foresee a positive
impact from the RFS, but describe the
repeal/change of the RFS as an adverse
risk, use 601.
201. +Income
[includes increase of demand, income,
revenue, market share, profits, the
gaining of new market in relations to
renewable energy, any positive business
venture as a result of the RFS]
202. Compliance is feasible / confident
with adaptation
[look for adjectives that indicates posi-
tive outlook in regards to RFS adop-




[includes decrease of demand, income,
revenue, market share, profits, the los-
ing of market share or any negative
result to the business venture as a result
of the RFS]
302. Compliance challenge / infeasible
[difficulties due to cost, technological
lag, blendwall, not enough volume to
comply or any other reasons]
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Support Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS)
Disagree with Renewable Fuel Standard
Suggested modification
a. Increase overall volume standard
b. Decrease overall volume standard
c. Maintain overall volume standard
d. Increase advanced biofuel volume standard
e. Decrease advanced biofuel volume standard
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203. Reduce costs of production
204. -Costs for customers
[including energy price]
205. +Return on investment
[referring specifically to stock market
related investment, e.g., share price]
206. +Facilities
[referring to physical facilities only-
increase capacity of manufacturing
facilities, factories, refineries, fixed
investments, opening and closing of
facilities]
207. No impact to the company due to
uncertainties related to RFS
208. Certainty for the biofuel industry
Positive impact prediction to the
401. +Domestic economy
[positive overall impact to
domestic, i.e., U.S., economy]
the
402. Energy independence
[reduce reliance on foreign supply of
energy, supply of raw material for the
production of energy such as corn,
sugarcane, etc.]
403. Supply of energy
[supply of energy remains steady or
there is no negative impact to supply,
or positive impact]
404. +Non-energy commodity price
[any positive impact, neutral effect, or




[any positive impact, neutral effect, or
it stabilizes food and feedstock prices,
food supply, and food security]
303. Increase costs of production
304. +Costs for consumers
[including energy price]
305. -Return on investment
[referring specifically to stock market
related investment, e.g., share price]
306. -Facilities
[referring to physical facilities only-
decrease capacity of manufacturing
facilities, factories, refineries, fixed
investments, opening and closing of
facilities]
307. Uncertainty caused by changing
RFS (by EPA or Congress)
[uncertainties caused by changes spe-
cifically related to RFS, where RFS is
specifically mentioned]
308. Uncertainty due to RIN price
volatility
Negative impact prediction to the
501. -Domestic economy
[negative overall impact to the
domestic, i.e., U.S., economy]
502. Dependence on foreign suppliers
[reliance on foreign supply of energy,
supply of raw material for the
production of energy such as corn,
sugarcane, etc.]
503. Supply of energy disruption
[disruption of energy supply, including
raw materials for energy]
504. -Non-energy commodity price
[increases or causes fluctuation of non-
energy commodity (non-food and non-
feedstock commodity) price]
505. -Food
[increases or causes fluctuation on food
and feedstock prices, food supply, and
food security]
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406. +Job market
[any positive impact in relations to
outsourcing, labor, labor market,
workforce, work, or employment]
407. +International economy
[positive impact to the international
economy]
601. General benefits that may or do
relate to RFS
[benefits due to changing environ-
mental and climate regulation and any
other issues in relation to RFS where
the RFS is not specifically mentioned;
when RFS is mentioned in a benefit,
identify the benefits and use 200 series
or 400 series Study Codes]
506. -Job market
[any negative impacts in relations to
outsourcing, labor, labor market,
workforce, work, or employment]
507. -International economy (price
volatility)
[negative impact to the international
economy]
I -
701. General risk that may or do
encompass RFS risk
[general risks which might be
indirectly related to the RFS where the
RFS is not specifically mentioned or
when it is specifically mentioned butla
just part of a big list of risks in a risk/
forward-looking statement]
Non-RFS related risk
801. Weather, climate, natural disasters
802. Climate change, global warming
803. Non-RFS legal changes
[legal changes that are not related to the RFS or the environment, e.g. legal,
financial, employment, laws, regulation]
804. Non-RFS related environmental legal risks
[refers to changes in any environmental laws such as low carbon fuel standards,










American Fuel Petrochemical Manufacturers
American Petroleum Institute
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APPENDIX B: SAMPLE CODES
Positive Impact Prediction Negative Impact Prediction
Comments The biodiesel industry clearly The RFS2 presents production
has the ability to meet its and logistic challenges for both
requirements under the RFS. the renewable fuels and petro-
leum refining and marketing
industries.
Form 10-K The most important of these A potential consequence of
programs is RFS2, which we failing to reduce the advanced
expect will create significant, bioftel category would be
stable and growing demand for increased imports of Brazilian
our biodiesel. sugar cane ethanol since it is
the most readily available
advanced biofuel. We do not
think that it was the intent of
Congress when they passed
the Energy Independence and
Security Act of 2007 to replace
crude oil imports with Brazil-
ian sugarcane ethanol imports.
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